BOOK REVIEW
FREE SocEY. By Franklyn S. Haiman. Chicago
& London: The University of Chicago Press. 1981. Pp. x, 499. $22.50.
SPEECH AND LAW IN A

Most books on freedom of speech set forth criteria for decision
purportedly based on the language of the first amendment,' the historical intent of the Framers, 2 the logical necessities of a system of selfgovernment, 3 or some other general theory which the author contends
must be accepted by any fairminded reader. As the proliferation of
articles and books suggests, no consensus on the proper criteria has
been achieved. Thus, in the final analysis, all criteria are based on the
individual author's premises, which are often hidden and which never
command universal agreement.
Speech and Law in a Free Society,4 Franklyn Haiman's comprehensive and well-written analysis of free speech issues, employs a
novel approach to this problem. In the opening pages of his introduction, Professor Haiman articulates six fundamental premises 5 that
serve as the foundation for the rest of his book. He makes no effort to
defend these premises, though not because they are indefensible. Indeed, his claim that they are "very much in the mainstream of this
country's political-philosophical tradition" 6 suggests that they are supportable on both historical and policy grounds. Yet Haiman recognizes that history and policy support conflicting views and that the
view one takes is likely to depend on one's values.
While he places a high value on all forms of expression and asserts
that few competing interests justify restraining it, Haiman accepts
disagreement with equanimity. "Since there is no ready agreement on
what these ultimate values are," he writes, "I will simply assert the
ones on which this book is premised so that the reader can take or
leave what he or she wants to in full knowledge of the implications of
that which is proposed." 7 Thus Haiman appears to be preaching to
the converted. Yet even unbelievers should benefit from his analysis of
some of our deepest and most troublesome problems involving free' See

I. Brant, The Bill of Rights: Its Origin and Meaning 223-36 (1965).

See Z. Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States 4-29 (1941) [hereinafter Free Speech].
See A. Meiklejohn, Political Freedom 27 (1960) [hereinafter Political Freedom].
4 F. Haiman, Speech and Law in a Free Society (1981) [hereinafter cited by page number
only]. The author is a Professor of Communication Studies at Northwestern University and
National Secretary of the American Civil Liberties Union.
pp. 6-7.
6P. 6.
7 Id.
2

3

714
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dom of speech and from his discussion of the Supreme Court's current
position on these problems.
Because Professor Haiman's analysis of free speech issues rests on
his six premises, much of this Review is devoted to assessing them.
Furthermore, while these premises seem reasonable, the conclusions

he draws from them differ in so many respects from existing law that
both his conclusions and his premises demand closer attention. Before
examining them in detail, however, a brief overview of Speech and
Law in a Free Society is in order.
Professor Haiman begins his discussion by addressing the question,
"What is Speech?"" A number of well known authors, most notably
Professor Thomas Emerson, have discussed the values served by communicative behavior and the institutional pressures for repression."
These considerations demonstrate the need for extraordinary judicial
protection of expression. Emerson proposes a definition of protected
speech that reflects a belief that a bright line test provides the maximum protection against the pressures to suppress expression.' 0 Professor Haiman, however, rejects this approach. In his view, attempts to
resolve free speech issues by definition merely mask value judgments

and are easily manipulated." Instead, Haiman would define all expressive behavior as speech deserving of first amendment consider-

ation. 2 He points out that all behavior can communicate ideas,' 3 and
he would exclude from the first amendment only behavior engaged in
for its own sake, irrespective of any possible effect upon an audience. 14
P. 16.
See T. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment (1966); T. Emerson,
The System of Freedom of Expression (1970) [hereinafter Freedom of Expression].
10 For example, Emerson draws a distinction between "conduct which consists of 'expression'
and conduct which consists of 'action.' " T. Emerson, Freedom of Expression, supra note 9, at
17. He explains:
The power of the society and the state over the individual is so pervasive, and construction
of doctrines, institutions, and administrative practices to limit this power so difficult, that
only by drawing such a protective line between expression and action is it possible to strike
a safe balance between authority and freedom.
Id. at 9.
" See pp. 16-30. Haiman uses Chafee's review of Meiklejohn's Free Speech and Its Relation
to Self-Government, Chafee, Book Review, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 891 (1949) [hereinafter Book
Review], to attack Meiklejohn's free speech definition, see A. Meiklejohn, Political Freedom,
supra note 3, at 8-28. See p. 17 n.7. Haiman also attacks Emerson, see T. Emerson, Freedom of
Expression, supra note 9, at 17, on the ground that "his system is open for anyone to call almost
any symbolic event 'action' because the context in which that communication occurs is viewed
with disfavor." P. 25.
'2 See pp. 30-35.
'- See pp. 30-31.
11 See p. 34. Even this kind of behavior may constitute speech, however, when endowed by
the actor, perceiver, or observer with meaning above and beyond the act itself. For example,
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Professor Haiman devotes the remainder of Speech and Law in a
Free Society to a four-part analysis of the interests that might be
asserted as a basis for limiting expression. 15 He first discusses societal
interests in restraining speech about others, that is, speech that will
cause the audience to think about and perhaps treat third persons
unfairly or less respectfully.' He places defamation, invasions of privacy, group libel, and speech interfering with fair trials in this category.17 Second, Haiman examines the rationale for restricting speech
directed at particular people who claim to have been injured by the
speech because the speech is offensive, as in cases of symbolic battery
or objectionable sights and sounds; or because the speech subtly shapes
the hearer's behavior, as in cases of morally debasing or unwholesome
speech; or because the speech prompts hearers to act to their detriment, as in cases of lies or coercion.18 Third, Haiman considers speech
that may lead the audience to engage in illegal acts such as conspiracy
and speech that incites the audience to illegal action. 19 Finally,
Haiman analyzes the role of government in the communication marketplace, that is, as it facilitates citizen expression, compels testimony
or the disclosure of information, withholds information of its own, or
expresses its own views. 20 This four-part framework clarifies the competing interests in free speech cases and shows how subtle their conflicts may be.
As might be expected, Professor Haiman's resolution of the conflicts between communication and other societal interests relies heavily on the six premises he articulates in his introduction. 2 1 His first
premise states:
Social order is a means of maximizing individual liberty and
security. It is not an end in itself. The self-expression and selffulfillment of the individuals who compose society are ends in
themselves. They also serve as a means through which a facilitative
22
social order is developed and maintained.
sitting at a lunch counter may be a statement about segregation, and murder an expression of
opposition to integration. See p. 33. While Haiman would prohibit behavior such as murder, in
which the nonsymbolic element is sufficiently harmful, see pp. 34-35, this concession is not a
matter of definition. It follows from the proposition, which he accepts, see pp. 38-39, that some
governmental interests justify, restrictions on speech.
1-See p. 40.
16 See p. 35.
17 See pp. 43-127.
18 See pp. 131-241.
1 See pp. 245-94.
'0See pp. 297-422.
21 See text accompanying notes 5-7 supra.
22 P. 6.
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This statement is neither controversial nor helpful. Of course perpetuation of the status quo is not an end in itself, and justifications should

be offered for maintaining it. Yet even suppression of speech could be
justified on the grounds that citizens are more content when they do

not reflect on the evils done to them. Simply asserting that expression
is an end of the social order as well as a means for achieving other
proper ends does not resolve the conflict between social order and
expression, since social order may promote other valuable ends besides
free expression. Implicit in Haiman's first premise is a high, almost

unequalled, valuation for expression. His resolution of free speech
problems, therefore, depends on other premises that justify the special
23
status of expression.
The major unspoken assumption in Haiman's first premise is that
all of the values that expression serves are values that the first amend-

ment protects. Thus, after listing several free expression values identified by other authors, such as promoting self-government, advancing
the search for truth, aiding stability, and checking governmental
overreaching,2 4 Haiman says that "none of the values of free expression which have been identified here or elsewhere need be, or should
'2 5
be, excluded as foundation stones of our First Amendment edifice.
In weighing the societal interests that conflict with free expression,

Haiman assigns a uniform value to the latter. The proposition that all
speech warrants the same protection, however, represents one side of
a fundamental disagreement among writers on the first amendment. 26
"3 Haiman's sixth premise, that "a democracy presumes that we can never be certain [that
truth] has been attained by any fallible human being" so "reliance is placed on a free marketplace of ideas" in "all... areas of human decision making," suffices to reject the hypothesized
justificiation for restricting speech. P. 7. One aspect of this premise is that government may never
suppress expression because of concern that the audience may agree with the speaker's beliefs.
This reviewer has taken the position that the central meaning of the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of speech and of the press is that suppression of ideas is not a legitimate function of
government. See Bogen, The Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Guarantee of Freedom of
Speech, 35 Md. L. Rev. 555 (1976) [hereinafter The Supreme Court's Interpretation]; Bogen,
First Amendment Ancillary Doctrines, 37 Md. L. Rev. 679 (1978); and Bogen, Balancing
Freedom of Speech, 38 Md. L. Rev. 387 (1979).
14 See p. 433 n.6.
2t Id.
2 Emerson, see T. Emerson, Freedom of Expression, supra note 9, at 6-7, and Chafee, see Z.
Chafee, Free Speech, supra note 2, at 33; Chafee, Book Review, supra note 11, at 900, take a
broad view of the purpose of the first amendment, while Meiklejohn, see A. Meiklejohn, Political
Freedom, supra note 3, at 27, advocates a narrower view that focuses on protecting the political
process. This reviewer's position, that government is forbidden from acting in order to suppress
ideas, see Bogen, The Supreme Court's Interpretation, supra note 23, at 557, assigns different
weights to speech values depending on the likelihood that government desires to suppress the
content of that speech. Cf. Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 Am. B.
Found. J.521 (a major value of free speech is its check on governmental abuse of power).

HeinOnline -- 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 717 1983

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:714

It is unlikely that the Framers contemplated first amendment
protection for every interest that expression may serve. 27 Nevertheless,
many of the steps leading to the guarantee of freedom of speech were
initially taken for narrow reasons which subsequent experience and
reflection converted to broader principles. 28 For example, the abolition of prior censorship in England was a product of practical concerns over problems of administration and restraint of trade. 29 The
censors had performed unsatisfactorily, delaying publication of inoffensive works, while allowing publication of objectionable books and
all too often accepting bribes. 30 Independent tradesmen had objected
to the monopoly given the Stationers Company under the licensing
system, and the House of Commons had perceived these restrictions as
driving up the price of books with no effective suppression of offensive
works. 31 By 1791, however, half a century of experience without the
Licensing Acts had converted practical rejection of an inefficient sys32
tem into a fundamental principle of liberty.
This same process may be at work in the constitutional guarantee
as well, and it may be appropriate to assimilate new expression values
into the interpretation of the guarantee. To acknowledge this process,
however, legitimates arguments on both sides of the question of
whether all speech interests deserve equal weight when balanced
against other societal interests. Thus Professor Haiman may be justified in neglecting history for it proves to be inconclusive on this issue.
Whether the reader agrees with Haiman's thesis that the free
speech guarantee protects all of the interests served by expression is
likely to depend on the specific results to which the thesis leads. One
benefit of seeking to further all of the values of speech is that difficult
distinctions which might be manipulated discriminatorily to silence
certain voices need not be made. Uniform valuation, however, poses
the risk of lowering speech protection to the lowest common denominator so that a societal interest sufficient to restrain commercial advertising or dissemination of pornography might be found to justify

27 Thus Rogers Smith has suggested that the interest in personal autonomy marks a significant shift from the Framers' conceptions of liberty. See Smith, The Constitution and Autonomy,
60 Tex. L. Rev. 175, 176-81 (1982).
28 See Bogen, The Origins of Freedom of Speech and of the Press, 42 Md. L. Rev. 129 (1983)
(pointing out that many of the sources of the constitutional guarantee, such as the priilege of
speech and debate in the legislature, the absence of prior restraint, and the practices of religious
toleration, began as pragmatic rather than principled actions).
21 See F. Siebert, Freedom of the Press in England 1476-1776, at 260-63 (1952).
20

See id.

31 See id.
3' See 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 151-52 (1769).
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restricting political speech. But Professor Haiman would guard
against this possibility by sharply limiting the acceptable justifications
33
for curtailing any speech.
Haiman's second premise addresses potential justifications for
restricting speech:
Symbolic behavior is one of the most fundamental ways in
which human beings express and fulfill themselves. Its exercise thus
lies at the core of a free society. Since law is a tool designed only to
prevent people from aggrandizing against one another, it is not an
appropriate mechanism for the prohibition
of words and deeds
34
which do no injury to other persons.
This premise includes several questionable assertions. For instance, that the function of the law is a limited, negative one is hardly
self-evident. Justice Holmes attacked this view more than a half century ago:
The liberty of the citizen to do as he likes so long as he does not
interfere with the liberty of others to do the same, which has been a
shibboleth for some well known writers, is interfered with by
school laws, by the Post Office, by every state or municipal institution which takes his money for purposes thought desirable, whether
he likes it or not. 35
Once law is conceived of as a tool to satisfy a wide variety of desires
and not just "to prevent people from aggrandizing against one another," Haiman's second premise falls.
Although he is disturbed by laws that punish victimless conduct,
such as public nudity, public sex, and neighborhood aesthetics,
Haiman does not think it necessary to challenge their legitimacy in
nonspeech contexts. a6 But if moral or aesthetic concerns are legitimate
interests for government to pursue when communication is not involved, it is hard to see why they should not be entitled to some weight
even where the objectionable conduct has communicative value. For
instance, Haiman argues that people can avert their eyes from a
depiction of sexual intercourse used to advertise a film and would
deny any authority to suppress it. 37 But if public sex can be banned

33 For a discussion of restrictions on commercial speech, see notes 72-74 and accompanying
text infra. For a discussion of restrictions on pornography, see notes 76-78 and accompanying
text infra.
34 P. 6.

35 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

31See p. 35.
37 See pp. 139-40, 144.
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when it does not constitute symbolic behavior, then public display of
depictions of nonsymbolic sex reasonably might also be banned.38
The assertion that symbolic behavior "lies at the core of a free
society" may be too broad. Language is symbolic behavior par excellence and is admittedly essential to a free society. Nonverbal communication often poses additional problems, however, and reasonable
people may differ on whether it deserves protection equal to that
appropriate for language. Professor Haiman's concern for nonverbal
symbolic behavior leads him to demand very strong justification for
any government interference with potentially communicative activity. Unless the injury caused by certain behavior is severe, he would
condition punishment of the action on the absence of a communicative intention. 39 Yet the result, as Haiman acknowledges, is that the
law will be applied unequally to people engaged in externally identical behavior. 40 Haiman argues that this protection is necessary for

symbolic behavior but disregards the social disadvantages of protecting obnoxious behavior rather than compelling the speaker to resort to
inoffensive means to convey the idea. While the choice of means may
color the message, the coloration is likely to arise from the very
offensiveness that makes the behavior punishable when engaged in for
nonexpressive purposes. If the government may punish draft card
burning by a pyromaniac, what should disable it from punishing the
same act committed by an opponent of the draft? 4' If it can punish
drying clothes on an outdoor line, 42 what should make it powerless to
deal with the offender who violates the same law to communicate his
distaste for high taxes? Professor Haiman would probably respond
that a socially obnoxious activity becomes socially useful when it
conveys a message. But if it is the act of communication and not the
particular message that matters, must one conclude that the value of
the act always outweighs its obnoxious effect? The social cost will vary
from case to case, yet unless it is extremely onerous, Haiman's calculus
would produce the same result.

3- Even justices who would strike down obscenity proscriptions might accept its ban in public
places. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 114 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("Difficult questions must still be faced, notably in the areas of distribution to juveniles and
offensive exposure to unconsenting adults."). Considering the partially captive nature of the
audience together with the objections to the nonsymbolic aspects of the offensive representations,
limits on public display of pictures of intercourse should not threaten the marketplace of ideas.
" See p. 36.
40 Id.
41 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); pp. 27-38.
42 See People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272 (1963); p. 158.
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There is, of course, a danger that enforcement of a speechrestrictive law may be triggered by objection to the message or that
the asserted interest of the government in enacting the law is merely a
pretext for suppressing communication. These problems could perhaps be resolved through the standard that the Supreme Court announced in United States v. O'Brien:
[W]e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently
justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government;
if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms
is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
43
that interest.
This standard resembles Professor Haiman's sliding scale of social
harms by which he would judge "sometimes-symbolic conduct." 44 For
instance, political assassination lies at the most violent end of the scale
and is clearly unprotected by the first amendment. At the other end
lies the case of the Pawnee Indian children who were suspended from
public school for wearing their hair in long braids in accordance with
the traditions of their culture.45 With regard to each extreme, and to
conduct in between, Haiman considers the relevant question to be
"whether the behavior does harm to others and, if so, to how serious a
degree."146 Haiman's formulation and resolution of the problem, however, differ from the Court's under the O'Brien standard in that he
considers a much narrower range of effects to be sufficiently harmful
to justify restrictions on symbolic behavior. The O'Brien standard
could also be used to invalidate restrictions on all but the most severely
harmful symbolic conduct, depending on how "important" or "substantial" one considers the state's interest to be. The Court, however,
applies the O'Brien standard cautiously, upholding any law directed
at legitimate ends where it is convinced by the importance of the
governmental interest or by the weakness of the relationship between
the act and the message that the law is not merely a pretext to suppress
47
the message.
43391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
44 P.

35.

41P. 34.
10 P. 35.
" See Metromedia Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981). For reasons of aesthetics and
traffic safety, the ordinance in question banned virtually all billboards except for onsite advertisements. Four of the six Justices who voted to strike it down did so because it improperly
favored commercial over noncommercial speech, and the remaining two did so because it
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Professor Haiman's contention that the law should not prohibit
words and deeds that do not injure others conceals another implicit
premise. If no one believed that particular words or symbolic acts
caused injury, there would be no reason to prohibit them; 48 thus every
law that restricts speech is prompted by a perception that the speech
causes some harm. But Haiman characterizes the harm to which the
state may properly respond as only that which results from action
prompted by the words or from the act chosen to convey the message.
He would exclude psychic injury suffered by the listener because of
the message communicated. He regards such injury as beyond the
capacity of the law to redress for several reasons. Individual responses
to a message are often unpredictable, as was that of the concentration
camp survivor who believed Nazi demonstrations to be part of the
price to be paid for free expression. 49 Predictions about individual
responses may also be prejudiced by stereotypes, as was Prosser's
comment that profanity is harmful when addressed to a "lady' but
not a marine. 50 Finally, limits to this type of restriction could not be
established on a principled basis, either as to where offensive messages
may be permitted or as to the types of groups or individuals who
deserve protection from such messages. 5 Unless the message-based
injury involves a deliberate falsehood, such as informing someone
falsely that her spouse has been maimed in an accident, or unless the
distress is the product of the context in which the message is communicated, as in the case of a bullying debt collector, Haiman would not
52
permit recovery for any psychic injuries suffered.
Professor Haiman would severely limit governmental power to
punish individuals even for face-to-face insults. 3 This kind of injury,
he asserts, is inextricably linked to the nature of the ideas communicated and cannot be restricted unless the government is permitted to
act with content bias.54 Yet, when a speaker chooses to convey a
constituted a total ban on the use of an entire medium. Thus seven Justices would have supported
a total ban on commercial billboards, and a limited restriction on noncommercial billboarcs
probably would have posed no problems. Haiman gives less weight to aesthetic interests. See pp.
157-58.
4 See pp. 155-56, 425.
Pp. 154-55.
p. 152.
Pl 154.
p.
.1 P. 155.

See pp. 132-34.
P. 133. The case law reveals that virtually every prosecution for "fighting words" has
involved an individual who verbally assaulted a representative of the government or a government institution. See list of cases found in Bogen, The Supreme Court's Interpretation, supra
note 23, at 584. This fact highlights the potential for using the fighting words doctrine to
suppress political criticism.
.1
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particular message for the sole purpose of causing psychic injury to the
person addressed, it is difficult to appreciate why such a deliberate
infliction of mental distress should be constitutionally protected.
Haiman suggests that an insult may help the addressee to understand
how strongly his or her behavior has affected the speaker. 5 5 It is a rare
addressee, however, who wants the information presented in this
way. Justice Powell has suggested that the law should recognize the
captive audience dimension of this problem.5 6 No idea should be
forbidden, but government should be permitted to regulate the context of the expression to protect individuals from a calculated affront.
Providing adequate protection for the expression of distasteful
ideas is a delicate task, but Professor Haiman does not demonstrate
that the required line drawing is impossible. He asserts that the harm
done is a product of the addressee's own mental processes, but even so
his recommendation that the addressee develop a tougher hide will
not appeal to many. 57 Eliminating all protection from verbal abuse
provides a clear and consistent standard, but the cost of clarity is high.
The best justification for Haiman's approach is not to denigrate the
injury suffered or to elevate the informational value to society of
verbal assaults but to argue that the line between willful infliction of
mental distress and mere expression of opinion is so tenuous that it
invites content-based repression. The cases demonstrate the potential
use of the "fighting words" doctrine to curtail expression, 58 and
Haiman may be correct that no line can be drawn that will avoid the
pitfalls. But reasonable efforts to draw such a line, for instance, by the
drafters of the Model Penal Code, 9 should be given time to establish
their validity. Experience should guide us in deciding whether a workable standard is possible.
Professor Haiman's third premise is sound, but he derives an
unusual conclusion from it. He asserts:
The human condition is not predetermined. Individuals,
within the limits of their intellectual and emotional development,
their physical environment, and the restraints which may be im-

P. 134.
See Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 905 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting). Powell was
concerned with the use of profanity at meetings where such use would not be anticipated. This
notion of what constitutes a captive audience is perhaps too broad. It does, however, reflect
concern for an individual confronted by a speaker who premeditates an affront to the listener.
57 See pp. 155-56.
See note 54 supra.
Model Penal Code § 250.4(b) (1962) ("A person commits a pftty misdemeanor if. . . he
...insults, taunts or challenges another in a manner likely w provoke violent or disorderly

conduct.").
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posed on them by other persons, are capable of free choice and are
responsible for the behavior which they choose. The philosophy of
free speech presumes the existence of the freedom to accept or
reject the alternatives which are offered. Communication which
does not allow for this autonomous decision-making violates the
integrity of those to whom it is addressed and thus does injury to
them. 60
The last sentence of this premise justifies laws against coercive or
intimidating communications, and against commercial deception.
With coercive or intimidating communications, fear may prevent the
listener from making an independent evaluation of the message by
comparing it with alternative viewpoints. With deceptive practices,
ignorance may prevent the listener from searching out alternative
viewpoints. Thus coercion and deception pollute the hearer's decisionmaking process and may be punished. Most people would agree with
this view, but many would not accept Haiman's carefully reasoned
limitation on the scope of governmental restrictions in this area. He
asserts that the law should restrict speech urging illegal action only "in
those circumstances where the inciting communicator coerces or deceives the audience into taking the action in question."' Haiman
properly insists that punishing the speaker detracts from a recognition
of the responsibility which the listener has for his or her actions,6 2 but
his solution absolves the speaker from all responsibility. Of course, the
person who commits an illegal act is responsible for that act and
should be punished for it. But the actor's responsibility does not
logically preclude finding that the speaker who urged the act also
bears some responsibility. Professor Haiman's argument is not wholly
invalid given the tendency of government to punish any speech that
might contribute to a listener's decision to commit an illegal act, but
he presses it too far. If no punishment attaches to incitement of illegal
activity, the speaker may wander throughout the land preaching
violence until someone responds to the incitement, and people get
hurt. Such a rule of law would deprive individuals of the security that
led them to form a government.
Although speakers deserve protection from repression prompted
by exaggerated fears, the difficulty of drawing a sensible line between
necessary and excessive restrictions should not discourage us from
trying. The line drawn by the Supreme Court in Brandenburg v.

- Pp. 6-7.
61P. 427. See also pp. 276-83.

'2See p. 283.
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Ohio6 3 is a sensible resolution of the problem. The speaker who advocates violence or law violation where that advocacy "is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such actions" should be liable to punishment for that advo64
cacy.
Professor Haiman states his fourth premise for resolving first
amendment issues as follows:
Although some individuals may be more intelligent, more mature
or better educated than others, every informed person is ultimately
the best judge of his or her own interests. Even if this were not the
case, it is more dangerous to try to determine who is best equipped
to make decisions for others
than it is for individuals to make
65
decisions for themselves.
The assertion made in the first sentence of this premise is dubious at
best. The pressures for immediate gratification often lead individuals
to make choices which they ultimately regret and which most objective observers would know they would ultimately reject. Drug and
alcohol abuse illustrate this proposition. But Haiman is far more
concerned with individual autonomy. The informed person, in his
view, is the "best" judge because paternalism violates individual integrity and responsibility. Haiman views human freedom as an end in
itself and not as a means to other ends, "not," Haiman writes, "because I am uninterested in the good life but because I am more
interested in how we go about the quest for it. I do not want somebody else deciding for me and my children what it is and handing it
'66

over to US."

33395 U.S. 444 (1969).

" See id.at 447. Sheldon Leader's thoughtful article presents still another view which
recognizes the potential value of illegal acts. Leader argues that civil disobedience is often a
useful agent of change in society. Furthermore, obedience to law ought to follow from one's full
exposure to the reasons for and against obedience. Although these considerations do not justify
withholding punishment for the illegal act, they should counsel protection of advocacy of
"conscientious" illegal activity. Leader, Free Speech and the Advocacy of Illegal Action in Law
and Political Theory, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 412 (1982). Concern that critics of the present form of
government will sometimes advocate terrorism, however, diminishes this reviewer's enthusiasm
for Leader's suggestions. A recent Supreme Court opinion does suggest some extension of Brandenburg in view of the kind of concerns raised by Leader. In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware,
102 S. Ct. 3409, 3433-34 (1982), the Court indicated that the showing of the likelihood of
imminent harm from a political speech may require a demonstration that the harm actually
occurred.
65P. 7.

el P. 181. Though Professor Haiman abhors paternalism on the part of the state, he would
permit parents to control their children's communicative behavior. See text accompanying notes
75-78 infra.
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Although some laws, such as those that regulate the sale of pornography or limit commercial speech, bear a trace of the paternalism
Haiman deplores, such laws almost always reflect a concern that the
individual listener, acting according to perceived self-interest, will
inflict harm on others. For example, pornography may lead some men
to view women as sex objects and to treat them in a dehumanizing
manner. 67 Professor Haiman responds:
there is something contradictory about calling people to higher
levels of humanity by limiting the range of experiences from which
they may make their choices. If our problem is that we do not
respect each other enough, that we exploit each others' gullibilities.
that we resort to violence too easily, that we lust too much and love
too little, I do not understand how improvement will be achieved
by the censorship of communication, which is itself a coercive tool
that treats us as objects to be manipulated by the censors rather
than as human beings with the capacity to learn and choose for
6
ourselves what is better and what is worse. 8
Haiman also argues that the possibility that unrestricted communication will engender anti-social conduct over the long term is too
remote to justify abridging free speech. "Suppression of communication that is presumed to have harmful long-term effects inevitably
would prohibit much that is harmless for most people and would miss
many other stimuli."'6 9 Yet, these criticisms aside, Haiman's own
framework raises the question whether pornography should be defined as "speech." Sexual intercourse is an example of behavior engaged in for its own sake rather than to communicate with spectators. 70 The desire to watch acts of sexual intercourse does not derive
from the "symbolic" nature of the acts, and pornographic depictions
or performances for pay may merely cater to that desire with no
attempt to convey a message. 71 Nevertheless, the underlying rationale
for obscenity laws seems to be that individuals should be discouraged
from thinking about sexual relationships in ways that society considers
undesirable. The impropriety of a restriction to limit ideas combined
with the difficulty of regulating obscenity without repressing symbolic
behavior persuades this reviewer to accept Professor Haiman's result,

67 See S. Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape 394 (1975); Garry,
Pornography and Respect for Women, 4 Soc. Theory & Prac. 395 (1978).
68 Pp. 173-74.
9 P. 175.
70 Behavior for its own sake, Haiman notes, is entirely outside first amendment protection

because it does not convey a message. See p. 34; note 14 and accompanying text supra.
71 See Schauer, Pornography and the First Amendment, 40 Pitt. L. Rev. 605, 616 (1979).
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even though some forms of obscenity may, by definition, not constitute speech.
Another example of Haiman's disapproval of what he perceives
to be paternalistic governmental intervention involves commercial
speech. Commercial advertisements create demands that may ultimately prove harmful to many people. Haiman is willing to prohibit
commercial speech that misrepresents a product, but he condemns
regulation of truthful commercial speech. 72 The case he uses to illustrate his position, ConsolidatedEdison Co. v. Public Service Commission,73 involved a regulation prohibiting power companies from placing leaflets encouraging energy consumption in bills mailed to their
customers. The case is an example of how the appeal to self-interest,
enjoyment of energy consuming devices, can harm the social interest
in energy conservation. Haiman would achieve conservation by public
appeals or government limitations on energy consumption rather than
by government manipulation of demand through restrictions on the
seller's efforts to stimulate demand. 4 Whether the New York law or
Professor Haiman's alternative approach would produce the greatest
individual satisfaction, however, is debatable. Restrictions on seller
speech where nonsellers are free to make the same statement may be a
small sacrifice of expression values, but Haiman insists on the widest
possible latitude for speech without distinction as to types of speech.
Haiman's fifth premise states:
Intellectual and emotional maturity are not exclusively, and
often not even primarily, a function of chronological age. There
are vast differences in these capacities across all age groups. Agebased qualifications for behaviors like voting, driving, drinking, or
marrying without parental consent are arbitrary societal restrictions based on statistical probabilities of competence, and as such
are deemed justifiable. Age-based limitations on access to communication are different in kind, however, because the competency in
question does not involve an ability to act in a socially responsible
way but rather to digest verbal and pictorial images. Whatever
evidence there may be of a correlation between chronological age
and the competence to behave responsibly with a ballot, car, drink,
or spouse is lacking with respect to the capacity to deal with
communicative stimuli. On the contrary, exposure to the widest

7 See pp. 157-63. Haiman recognizes that, in the absence of regulation, some truthful
commercial speech, such as billboards in the wilderness, may have significant aesthetic impact

on the environment. See p. 157.
73 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
14

See pp. 141-42.
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possible range of communication
may well be the most effective
75
growth-producing experience.
Professor Haiman thus concludes that "adults only" is not a
proper restriction on any communication.7 6 Exposure to some types of
communication, however, can be harmful to an immature listener.
Sexually explicit materials, for instance, may encourage sexual activity among children before they can appreciate its physical and psychological risks. Just as society may prohibit sexual activity among children, may it not also limit inducements to such activity? Haiman
insists that age-based limitations are arbitrary. Of course a child's
maturity is not exclusively a function of his or her age; using age as a
proxy for maturity is both overbroad and underinclusive. But age
bears at least some correlation to maturity, as Haiman admits, 77 and,
unlike other invidious proxies like race or sex, its discriminatory impact is vitiated by the fact that youth inevitably will be outgrown.
Moreover, any individualized test for maturity, assuming one could
be devised, would be difficult, if not impossible, to administer.
Haiman accepts age restrictions on voting and drinking, but he
sees no justification for such restrictions on speech. Yet, even if juveniles ultimately profit from and are not corrupted by exposure to
sexually explicit materials, Haiman's prescription disregards an important practical problem. Given societal views that children must be
shielded from the profane and the erotic in order to grow up in a
"civilized" manner, eliminating a double standard ironically may
diminish constitutional protection for offensive and sexually explicit
forms of expression. 8 Political pressure to subdue the intensity of
public discourse, to make it all safe for children, could become irresistable.
Professor Haiman's final premise states:
Whether or not one believes, theoretically, in the existence of
absolute truth, a democracy presumes that we can never be certain
it has been attained by any fallible human being. Thus, reliance is
placed on a free marketplace of ideas trusting that, even if the

7- P. 7 (emphasis in original).
76 See pp. 178-80.
77 See p. 178.
78 The Court expressed a similar &oncern in Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)

(state law banning books tending to corrupt minors would "burn the house to roast the pig"), but
its decision in FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (pervasive nature of radio justifies restricting
daytime broadcast of satirical monologue about "dirty words") should stand as a warning that a
uniform obscenity standard for children and adults alike could have a depressing effect on the
vitality of public discourse.
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wisest decisions do not always emerge victorious, the likelihood is
greater of approximating truth and avoiding the most serious errors
when communication is free than when it is restricted. This principle applies to the process of self-government
as well as to all other
79
areas of human decision making.

Thus Professor Haiman advocates both constitutional interpretations
and statutory enactments that will promote robust competition in the
"marketplace of ideas."
In general, Haiman asserts that "[u]nless the harm done by an act
of communication is direct, immediate, irreparable, and of a serious
material nature, the remedy in a free society should be more
speech. "'

80

On this basis, Haiman concludes that the law of defama-

tion should be abandoned unless the defamer refuses to disseminate a
reply, even where the defamatory statements are clearly baseless and
malicious. "[W]e should operate on the assumption that the right to
reply to alleged defamations will be a sufficient remedy in a society
whose members have learned to listen critically and with suspended
judgment to personal attacks.""'
Unfortunately, society does not always listen critically or disinterestedly. Picture a scandal magazine free to tell outrageous, deliberate lies subject only to the defamed individual's right to reply. A reply
would not provide the public with the benefit of a jury's deliberate,
intensive examination of the truth of the damaging statement. Nor
would a written reply to an anonymous public carry the same weight
that live testimony before a jury would, especially if published in the
defamer's own scandal sheet. Furthermore, the individual would
probably be reluctant to reply for fear of perpetuating public awareness of the original statement. Even if a right of reply could rehabilitate the reputation of a defamed individual, it might not remedy the
psychic injury suffered; a right of reply should not preclude a right to
recover damages.
Professor Haiman does not demonstrate that the values his proposal would advance are substantial enough to override these concerns. There seems little value in encouraging deliberate publication
of falsehoods or harmful statements made in reckless disregard of their
truth. Penalizing those who make false statements arguably poses a
risk that discussion of public affairs will be stifled. In New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan,8 2 however, the Court attempted to minimize this risk
-1 P. 7.
FOP. 425.
P' 426.
p.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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by holding that a public official could not recover for libel unless he
proved that the libelous statement was made with "actual malice or
with reckless disregard of whether the statement was true or false. "'
The New York Times standard may not provide adequate protection

because it applies only to public officials and public figures as narrowly defined by the Court. 84 This problem could be remedied by
extending the New York Times standard to all persons, public and
private. 5 By requiring anyone who alleges defamation to show actual
malice, the Court could insure robust public discussion of matters of

general interest and still prohibit deliberate falsehoods which
Haiman's right of reply remedy would allow.

Professor Haiman would also expand the concept of the public
forum to include private property that is quasi-public in character,"6
to compel media that sell advertising space to use content neutral
grounds for accepting or rejecting ads,87 and to require media with a
virtual monopoly in a particular market to allow replies to editorial
attacks8 and to donate a portion of their time or space for public
access.89 Whether the specific measures Haiman advocates will actu-

ally enlarge the public forum and facilitate the expression of ideas is
questionable. It is unclear whether access laws, including the "fairness

83 Id. at 279-80.
,4 The Court has permitted private individuals to recover damages for libel although their
activities were the subject of public or general interest. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111
(1979) (scientist whose federally funded research was criticized publicly by U.S. senator as
wasteful could recover); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (lawyer representing
family of victim slain by policeman could recover from newspaper that called him a "Communist").
85The protection could be limited to persons mentioned in discussions of public interest. The
Court experimented with this approach in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971),
but abandoned it in Gertz. v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
Another alternative that might protect individuals from the injuries of libel and still
encourage speech would combine the Times standard for all persons with a right of reply. The
Court would require a showing of knowledge of reckless falsehood, but add that a failure to print
a retraction or reply when subsequently informed of the facts would convert a negligent
falsehood into a knowing one.
86 See pp. 323-26. The principle example of such property is the modern shopping center.
Compare Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968) (labor
pickets may not be excluded from privately owned shopping center) with Hudgens v,NLRB, 424
U.S. 507 (1976) (effectively overruling Logan Valley).
V See pp. 334-35. Haiman does not claim that access to the media is a constitutional right
but urges the constitutionality of legislation prohibiting the media from discriminating among
potential paid advertisers despite the Court's contrary view in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). See pp. 332-33.
8 See pp. 338-39. But see Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)
(invalidating state law requiring newspaper to give political candidate a right to reply).
89 See pp. 335-39.
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doctrine" regulations upheld in Red Lion BroadcastingCo. v. FCC, 0
encourage discussion or, by making the broadcaster reserve expensive,

limited airtime for the personal expression of views, ultimately diminish public discussion. Greater public access does not necessarily mean

that subjects of public interest will predominate in the media.,, The
increased governmental involvement in regulating communications

that would be necessary to implement these proposals,
moreover,
2

poses dangers that Professor Haiman would abhor.9
Professor Haiman's commitment to open discussion includes protection for picketing intended to promote economic boycotts. "[T]he
only relevant question for determining whether First Amendment
guarantees should apply [to picketing] is whether the picketing is
peaceful and devoid of threats of physical injury to the lives, limbs or
0' 3
property of either the target or of potential workers and customers.
He then argues that "although limitations on secondary picketing 4 by
non-union groups should be unacceptable, they may be justified
within the limited confines of labor-management relations, where
they may be viewed as the First Amendment price that has been paid

for special picketing privileges that have been legislatively granted in
return." 9 5 Yet the specific union that pickets has never expressly consented to give up its rights. The principle that free speech rights may
be limited in exchange for the grant of other rights without the
consent of the affected party could justify a broad range of speech
limitations. Haiman's bargain, exchanging limits on secondary picketing for this "privilege' that would exist anyway under his scheme, is

'J 395 U.S. 367 (1969); see F. Friendly, The Good Guys, the Bad Guys and the First
Amendment 1-77, 192-98 (1976) (discussing Red Lion).
' Would requiring the print media, for example, to publish all advertisements submitted
facilitate the exchange of ideas or encourage more "SWM seeks SWF for mutual exploration of
sensual pleasures?"
'2 See Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973). In
the CBS case, the Court refused to force the network to sell airtime to "responsible" organizations for political messages, in part because such a system would require the FCC to "oversee
more of the day-to-day operations of broadcasters' conduct." Id. at 127. The Court concluded
that: "'[r]egimentingbroadcasters is too radical a therapy for the ailment." Id. Like the dissenters
in CBS, Haiman believes that these problems are speculative and could be met by properly
drafted laws. See id. at 202-04 (Brennan, J., dissenting); pp. 334-35. The tendency of government to support traditional views, however, should give pause to public access advocates who
want to bring government into the business of regulating the media.
P. 237. (emphasis in original).
" Secondary picketing involves picketing off the site of the main dispute, e.g., at the location
of a manufacturer who does business with the employer whose practices are the primary subject
of a labor dispute (footnote added).
"I p. 237.
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no "bargain" at all.96 Haiman criticizes others for leaving holes in
their free speech theory where their immediate values conflict with
the system erected, yet this concession to labor law appears to expose
Haiman to the same complaint.
Professor Haiman's expectation that most readers will agree with
his premises 7 is likely to be true only if his audience is limited. But
that would be unfortunate, for his book should be read by everyone
concerned with the issues of free speech. The book unquestionably
fulfills at least one of the author's hopes, "that even those who do not
share these premises will benefit from the analysis and be aided in
crystallizing their own alternatives." 98 Haiman confronts the toughest
issues with style and an unflinching vision. Grappling with Haiman's
vision of a free society is good exercise for every mind, even if one
concludes that fear of Orwell's "Big Brother" has led him to promote a
disquietingly tough alternative.
The genius of American society has been an avoidance of extremes, a pragmatic approach to tough issues that balances competing
interests. There ought to be a way to promote a civil society without
severely repressing individual expression, a civil society that leaves
room for a rich emotional life. The Supreme Court has taken this
pragmatic course by adopting the principle that suppression of ideas is
never a legitimate governmental purpose and by developing tests to
insure that no law promotes such a purpose. A developing appreciation of the proper function of those tests-an appreciation fostered by
Professor Haiman's critique-can enable the Court to chart a clearer
course that preserves free expression without sacrificing legitimate
social goals.
DAVID

S. BOGEN*

91 Moreover, the example Haiman gives of a privilege granted in exchange for limits on
secondary picketing-the right to picket in privately-owned shopping centers, see p. 237-is a
poor choice, since elsewhere he argues that the first amendment should protect nondisruptive
communication in shopping centers. See p. 326.
97 See p. 6.
98 Id.
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland. B.A., 1962, LL.B., 1965, Harvard University;
LL.M., 1967, New York University.
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